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Abstract
We explore how the underemployment problem of less-developed economies is related
to income inequality. Our crucial assumption is that consumers have non-homothetic pref-
erences over differentiated products of formal-sector goods and thus that inequality affects
the composition of aggregate demand via the price-setting behavior of formal-sector firms.
We find that (i) high inequality divides the formal sector into mass producers (which charge
low prices that are within the reach of the poor) and exclusive producers (which charge
high prices and sell only to the rich); (ii) high inequality generates an equilibrium where
many workers are crowded into the informal economy; and (iii) an increase in subsistence
productivity raises the wages of unskilled workers and boosts employment due to the higher
purchasing power of poorer households.
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1 Introduction
An old idea in economics holds that a more egalitarian income distribution may be beneficial
for aggregate employment through its effect on the composition of consumer demand. High
purchasing power in the hands of the lower classes generates large markets that foster industri-
alization and the emergence of a mass-consumption society. In contrast, high inequality may
generate a large reserve army of labor stuck in agriculture or marginalized in urban areas. As
a result, high ex-ante inequality in the distribution of productive resources can be an obstacle
to economic development.
In this paper, we present a dual economy model with a modern (formal) sector and a
subsistence (informal) sector in which income inequality becomes a crucial determinant of
modern-sector employment. We focus on a novel mechanism largely neglected by the previous
literature: the impact of income inequality on prices and mark-ups set by modern firms. The
basic idea is that an unequal income distribution may induce some firms to set high prices
and mark-ups and sell their products exclusively to rich consumers. Other firms set low prices,
making their product affordable to the poor. We will call the latter firms "mass producers" and
the former firms "exclusive producers" (because they charge prices unaffordable to the poor and
"exclude" them from the customer base). Because a more unequal society will generate a higher
(lower) fraction of exclusive (mass) producers, and because exclusive (mass) producers hire few
(many) workers, a negative impact of inequality on formal-sector employment is established.
Empirical evidence is consistent with such a negative inequality-employment relationship.
Chong and Gradstein (2007) find a robust correlation between income inequality and various
measures of informal-sector activity in a cross section of countries and show that this relation-
ship is robust to various measures of informality and/or inequality. Rosser et al. (2000) use
panel data from 16 transition economies and document that increases in inequality are associ-
ated with larger shares of output in the informal economy. Winkelried (2005) uses a panel of
Mexican metropolitan areas and finds that informal-sector activity is positively affected by the
Gini coefficient. Moreover, a large middle class (as measured by the third and fourth quintiles
of the income distribution) is strongly negatively associated with the size of the informal sector.
For obvious reasons, our analysis is of particular relevance to developing economies where
the formal sector is small, leaving the economy with a reserve army of labor trapped in sub-
sistence. Arguably one of the most important obstacles for the development of a dynamic
manufacturing sector is a weak education system and a lack of entrepreneurial talent. Rep-
resenting an additional major obstacle to entry are high direct or indirect entry costs that
may be prohibitive even for promising projects. One important reason is the limited access to
credit (see, e.g., Djankov et al. 2005). Moreover, there is ample evidence that setting up a new
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business is often associated with extremely high costs (De Soto 1989, Tybout 2000). Govern-
ment regulation, high fees and time-consuming procedures can often make it costly to start up
a new business (Djankov et al. 2002). Additional entry costs may arise from corruption and
bribes to overcome and/or speed up the start-up process of new business (see, e.g., Foellmi
and Oechslin, 2007).
To capture such major barriers to entry, high fixed costs and a limited supply of entrepre-
neurial skills are crucial ingredients of our model. We assume that there are skilled workers
and unskilled workers. Skilled workers are rich and can afford the goods supplied by both
mass and exclusive producers. Unskilled workers are poor and can afford only the subset of
the goods supplied by mass producers. Moreover, skilled workers decide whether to set up
and run a modern firm or to work in production at high wages. In equilibrium, they are fully
employed and indifferent between the two activities. Unskilled workers either find employment
in the modern sector or are otherwise trapped in subsistence. In equilibrium, the wages of
unskilled workers are governed by productivity in subsistence. and unskilled workers are in-
different regarding whether they work between working in the formal sector or in subsistence
production.1
A situation with exclusive producers and mass producers is hard to generate in the standard
monopolistic competition model, where consumers have homothetic preferences and prices and
mark-ups are invariant to market size. As a result, our analysis deviates from the standard
model by assuming non-homothetic preferences. To generate the above price and employ-
ment effect, our specification of preferences features demand functions with decreasing price
elasticities. Decreasing price elasticities imply that rich consumers who are able to select a
point lower down in the demand curve have a lower price elasticity, allowing firms to charge a
higher mark-up. The simplest case that generates such a situation is that of quadratic prefer-
ences. Quadratic preferences feature linear individual demand curves (with potentially binding
non-negativity constraints) and provide us with a simple and tractable framework of analysis.
Nevertheless, the quadratic specification should be viewed as an example that, as discussed at
the end of the paper, extends to more general specifications of preferences.
Understanding the role of non-homothetic preferences for aggregate outcomes is of more
general importance. On the one hand, the standard assumption of homothetic preferences is
1The assumption that workers are indifferent between subsistence and formal sector work is made for simplic-
ity. We could think of a factory-premium wage (as in Murphy et al. 1989) or an efficiency wage (as in Dasgupta
and Ray 1987, or Bulow and Summers 1986). Adding such assumptions would generate an equilibrium where
unskilled workers are strictly better off when employed in the formal sector. However, these assumptions would
have an impact on the shape of the (effective) labor supply function. Because the main point of our analysis
is on how inequality affects the product and labor demand of modern sector firms, the particular shape of the
labor supply function is not essential.
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highly unrealistic from an empirical point of view. Previous empirical research on the shape
of Engel curves has uniformly rejected the hypothesis of unit income elasticities for all prod-
ucts.2 On the other hand, the aggregate implications of non-homothetic preferences are not
well understood, as the representative agent paradigm can no longer be applied. This is par-
ticularly relevant in the context of developing economies, where income differences between
consumers are typically very large. potentially interesting feature of non-homothetic pref-
erences are variable mark-ups. As a result, incorporating non-homothetic preferences into a
general-equilibrium framework highlights interesting interactions between inequality on the one
side and mark-ups, real wages, the size distribution of modern firms, and the allocation of em-
ployment across sectors on the other side. Such interrelationships, while potentially important
in practice, are ruled out by assumption in the standard framework with CES preferences.3
This model yields three important results. First, sufficiently high inequality divides the
modern sector into mass-consumption firms and exclusive firms. Such an asymmetric equi-
librium arises even though all modern firms are assumed to be identical ex ante (i.e., have
identical cost and demand curves). In equilibrium, firms are indifferent between selling only to
the rich at high prices or selling to both the rich and the poor at lower prices. In other words,
there are small markets, where producers take advantage of the rich’s high willingness to pay
and set prices that the poor cannot afford, and there are mass markets, where producers set
low prices and take advantage of a large market.
Second, an exogenous increase in inequality is associated with lower labor demand by the
modern sector. The effect is driven by the composition of modern-sector firms. When inequality
is high, there are few mass producers and many exclusive producers. When inequality is low,
mass consumption is more prevalent, and the overall level of formal-sector employment is large.
The reason is that, with high inequality, both mass producers and exclusive producers set higher
prices and mark-ups. As a result, for given wages, the aggregate demand for unskilled labor
falls, and the fraction of poor households engaged in subsistence increases. This result holds
true regardless of the size of the subsistence sector.
Third, an increase in subsistence productivity boosts the wages and employment of unskilled
workers. Higher subsistence productivity forces modern firms to pay higher unskilled wages,
reducing aggregate inequality. Because of the reasons outlined in the previous paragraph,
the extent of mass consumption and hence formal-sector employment increases. Moreover, an
increase in subsistence productivity may not only increase the welfare of poor households but
2For a recent summary of the state of research on Engel-curves, see Lewbel (2006).
3 In the second part of their seminal paper, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) explore the implications of variable
elasticities of substitution (VES). However, they abstain from introducing income inequality into their model.
Our analysis shows that introducing heterogeneous consumers fundamentally changes the character of the general
equilibrium.
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may also increase the welfare of the rich. Even though higher unskilled wages decrease the
income of wealthy households, the rich benefit from lower inequality due to a larger menu of
mass-consumption goods and their lower prices.
There is a small literature studying how the interaction of non-homothetic preferences
and income distribution affects the sectoral distribution of output and employment in the
context of economic development. Matsuyama (2002) studies a model where consumers have
non-homothetic preferences and income inequality affects employment in dynamic sectors that
generate technical progress via learning-by-doing. He is interested in the dynamic evolution
of the economy, whereas our focus is on aggregate employment in a static context. Moreover,
firms in the Matsuyama model operate on competitive product markets, whereas in our model
firms exert market power and crucially affect employment via price setting. Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1989) study the effect of income inequality on market size and manufacturing
employment under non-homothetic preferences. Their focus is on the entry of firms operating
with superior technologies; in their model, mark-ups and prices are taken as given. In contrast,
our analysis focuses on a situation where entry is prohibited and income distribution effects
work via endogenous prices and mark-ups.4
Winkelried (2005) presents a model where firms decide whether or not to enter the formal
sector. In this decision, the size of the market (which is determined by the distribution of in-
come across households) plays an important role. This is different from the present framework,
where all informal-sector workers are trapped in subsistence. Saint-Paul (2006) studies a mo-
nopolistic competition model with non-homothetic preferences and shows that non-homothetic
preferences that feature decreasing price elasticities of demand generate an ambiguous relation-
ship between technical progress and the real wage. While the mechanism in the present paper
is similar, Saint-Paul sticks to a representative agent framework and studies the impact of the
factor-income distribution in the context of long-run growth. In contrast, our focus is on a
developing economy and the interaction between price-setting behavior and income inequality,
which allows us to explore the effects of inequality on formal-sector employment.5
4Other papers that incorporate non-homothetic preferences into a general equilibrium framework are
Falkinger (1994), Chou and Talmain (1996), Li (1996), Galor and Moav (2004), and Foellmi and Zweimüller
(2006) in the context of economic growth and Flam and Helpman (1987), Matsuyama (2000), and Mitra and
Trindade (2005) in the context of international trade.
5Our analysis can in principle also be applied to the context of developed economies to study labor-market
equilibrium and the determination of factor prices in the "medium run" (Blanchard, 1997; Solow 2000). Instead
of working in the informal economy, workers who do not get a job in the monopolistic sector are unemployed. Our
analysis shows that the interaction of monopolistic firms’ price-setting behavior and the distribution of income
across households give rise to an upward-sloping "price setting curve" (higher average prices are associated
with lower employment and higher unemployment). Adding a story about wage setting would let us end
up with a "medium-run" equilibrium. A related earlier literature addresses the issue of whether there may be
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our basic model and derive the
households’ optimal consumption levels and the monopolists’ optimal prices and quantities.
Section 3 characterizes an asymmetric equilibrium. Section 4 briefly presents the symmetric
case. Section 5 addresses the question of our primary interest: the relationship between in-
equality and modern-sector employment. In section 6, we discuss the robustness of our results
with respect to the central assumptions, and section 7 concludes.
2 A model of monopolistic competition with quadratic prefer-
ences
2.1 Consumers
There is a population of heterogenous households with total mass 1. To keep the analysis
transparent and simple, we consider a two-class society with β rich and 1−β poor households.
Rich households are endowed with skilled labor ("entrepreneurial talent" or "human capital").
Poor households are endowed with unskilled labor. Subscripts P and R refer to poor (unskilled)
households and rich (skilled) households. (The terms "unskilled" and "poor" and the terms
"skilled" and "rich" will be used synonymously). The aggregate stocks of skilled and unskilled
labor are denoted by H and L, respectively. The typical poor household is therefore endowed
with L/β units of unskilled labor and the typical rich household is endowed with H/(1 − β)
units of skilled labor.6 The compensations of skilled and unskilled labor are denoted by r and
w, respectively. Members of a poor household devote an (endogenous) fraction 1− of their
labor endowment to subsistence production and fraction to employment in the formal sector.
Hence they earn market income w L/β. Members of a rich household work in the formal sector
only and earn market income rH/(1− β).
All households have the same preferences over a continuum of differentiated products
indexed by j. The various goods enter utility in a symmetric and separable way. It is
assumed that the utility gain from consuming x units of a particular good j is given by
unemployment when the labor market is competitive but the product market is not (see Hart 1982, D’Aspremont
et al. 1990, Dehez, 1985, and Silvestre, 1990; for a survey of this literature, see Silvestre, 1993). This literature
points out that unemployment may occur when firms’ revenues are bounded and thus that labor demand may
fall short of labor supply, even when the wage rate falls to zero. Such a possibility also arises in our model.
While these papers have been concerned with the existence of unemployment equilibria in a representative-agent
environment, our model focuses on the effect of heterogeneous consumers.
6 In a previous version of this paper, we allowed for a more flexible specification of the composition of income
source. More precisely, it was assumed that poor households earned their income predominantly from unskilled
labor but had also some income from the other production factor. Similarly, for rich households. The present
analysis can be extended to such a situation. We will come back to this issue in the discussion section below.
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v(x(j)) = s2/2− (s− x(j))2 /2 with s being the saturation level.
Suppose N differentiated goods are supplied at prices {p(j)}Nj=0 . A typical rich household
decides how to allocate income rH/(1− β) across the various differentiated goods and solves
the problem
max
{xP (j)}Nj=0
Z N
0
s2 − [s− xR(j)]2
2
dj s.t.
Z N
0
p(j)xR(j)dj ≤ rH/(1− β) (1)
which yields first order conditions
xR(j) = s− λRp(j) if p(j) ≤ s/λR, and (2)
xR(j) = 0 if p(j) > s/λR.
where λR is the marginal utility of income of a rich household.
A typical poor household has to decide how to allocate market income · wL/β across
differentiated products and how allocate the labor endowment between employment in the
formal sector and subsistence, respectively. For simplicity, it is assumed that one unit of
unskilled labor yields subsistence output γ and that one unit of the subsistence good yields
one unit of utility. Hence a poor household solves the problem
max
{xP (j)}Nj=0,
Z N
0
s2 − [s− xP (j)]2
2
dj+γ(1− )L/β s.t.
Z N
0
p(j)xP (j)dj ≤ yP ≡ w L/β (3)
which yields first order conditions
xP (j) = s− λPp(j) if p(j) ≤ s/λP , and (4)
xP (j) = 0 if p(j) > s/λP ,
and
= 1 if w > γ/λP , (5)
∈ [0, 1] if w = γ/λP ,
= 0 if w < γ/λP ,
where λP is the marginal utility of income of a poor household. To have an interesting problem,
we assume γ/s < a(1 − α). If this condition did not hold, no poor household would work in
the formal sector. 7
7We could also assume that the rich have the option to work in the informal sector. Under the condition
s
F
φ2
1−φ s−
s
1−β
φ2
1−φ > γ — where φ = aα (1− α)L/(sF (αH − (1 − α)L)) and a, α, and F are technology
parameters (see below) — we get rλR > wλP . This guarantees that, in the interesting equilibrium where the
poor are indifferent between working in the formal and the informal sector, the rich are strictly better off when
working in the formal sector.
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2.2 Firms
Firms in the modern sector of the economy sell the differentiated products on monopolistically
competitive output markets. Setting up and running a modern firm requires an input of F
units of skilled labor. To produce output firms hire skilled and unskilled workers using the
Leontief technology X(j) = amin{αH(j), (1−α)L(j)} where X(j) denotes the output of firm
j and a > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1) are technology parameters. With such technology, the unit cost of
production are equal to c = a−1 (r/α+ w/(1− α)).
Which prices will firms set and which quantities will they supply? Consider a situation
where N firms have entered the market and consumers make consumption choices that obey
the above first order conditions (2) and (4). The level of market demand faced by firm j is
simply the sum of individual demands. Using first order conditions for the respective types
of consumers (noting that their λ’s are different), the market demand function of this firm,
X(j, p(j)), is given by
X(j, p(j)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0
(1− β) [s− λRp(j)]
s− [βλP + (1− β)λR] p(j)
if p(j) ∈ [s/λR,∞),
if p(j) ∈ [s/λP , s/λR),
if p(j) ∈ [0, s/λP ) .
(6)
In other words, horizontal aggregation of individual households’ demand functions yields a
piecewise linear market demand function with kinks at the reservation price levels of rich and
poor consumers s/λR and s/λP , respectively. When the price exceeds the reservation price of
the rich, p(j) ≥ s/λR, market demand is zero. For prices between the reservation prices of rich
and poor, p(j) ∈ (s/λP , s/λR], only rich consumers purchase and the market demand function
is steep. For prices that fall short of the reservation price of the poor, p(j) < s/λP , both rich
and poor consumers purchase and the market demand function is flat (Figure 1).
Figure 1
The monopolist supplying variety j is negligibly small relative to the aggregate economy.
It takes as given the unit cost of production c (and hence factor prices w and r) and the
consumers’ λ’s (which depend on prices of all other goods and on consumers’ incomes). The
firm chooses the price p(j) that maximizes the profit function
[p(j)− c]X(j, p(j))
With the piecewise linear market demand function (6) there are two candidates for the monopoly
price: the profit-maximizing price along the steep segment (where only the rich buy) or the
profit-maximizing price along the flat segment (where all consumers buy).
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Maximizing the profit function yields the respective monopoly prices along these two seg-
ments as
p(j) =
⎧⎨⎩ pE = 12 [c+ s/λR]pM = 12 [c+ s/ (βλP + (1− β)λR)]
along the steep segment, and
along the flat segment.
(7)
Equation (7) shows that prices and mark-ups depend on the consumers’ λ0s. In other words,
price setting is determined by the distribution of income (and hence the distribution of λ’s).
The larger the difference between λP and λR the larger will be the difference between pE and
pM .
Notice how this model with linear demand curves differs from the standard CES framework.
In the CES framework, prices are just a multiple of marginal cost with a mark-up that reflects
the consumers’ elasticity of substitution between the various products. In the CES framework
only equilibrium quantities but not equilibrium prices depend on consumers’ marginal utility of
income. This is different in the present situation. The ratio of a monopolistic producer’s price
over the unit costs of production also depends on the fundamental parameters of the model,
not only preference but also technology parameters and the distribution of income. The reason
is that, with linear demand curves, the elasticity of demand falls along the demand curve.
3 An asymmetric equilibrium
We now characterize an equilibrium where firms are indifferent between choosing the monopoly
point of the steep and the flat segment of the market demand curve. Firms that supply along
the steep segment are "exclusive producers": they charge a high price and sell only to the rich.
(By setting a high price they "exclude" poor households from the market). Firms that supply
along the flat segment are "mass producers". Their prices are sufficiently low so that not only
the rich but also poor households can afford these goods.
3.1 Mass and exclusive producers
In this section we solve for the general equilibrium of the model in the asymmetric case. (The
symmetric equilibrium will be briefly discussed later on). We are free to choose a numeraire
so let us set pM = 1. For further use the following lemma is helpful.
Lemma 1 Denote, respectively, by
¡
XE, pE
¢
and
¡
XM , 1
¢
the equilibrium quantities and
prices supplied along the steep and the flat segment of the market demand curve. Quantities
and prices satisfy the following equations
XE = (1− β)s p
E − c
2pE − c
9
and
XM = s
1− c
2− c
The corresponding profits are ΠE = (pE − c)xE and ΠM = (1− c)xM .
Proof. We express the λ’s in terms of pE and c and substitute the resulting expressions
into the individual demands (4) and (2). This yields
xEP = 0, x
M
P = s− sβ
h
1
2−c −
1−β
2pE−c
i
,
xER = s− s
h
1
2pE−c
i
pE, xMR = s− s
h
1
2pE−c
i
,
(8)
where xEi denotes the quantity purchased by a consumer of type i ∈ {R,P} when the firm
chooses the exclusive strategy (= charges the high price) and xMi denotes the respective
quantities when the firm chooses the mass consumption strategy (= charges the low price).
The equilibrium output of exclusive producers is XE = (1 − β)xER and of mass producers,
XM = βxMP + (1 − β)xMR . Using the above expressions for xMP xER, and xMR yields the values
for XE and XM .
In an equilibrium with mass and exclusive producers both types of firms make the same
profits ΠM = ΠE . Since firms are symmetric ex ante (i.e. every firm has the same demand-
and cost-curves) they are indifferent between mass production and exclusion. Profits are
ΠM = (1− c)XM for a mass producer and ΠE = (pE − c)xE for an exclusive producer. Using
Lemma 1 this equilibrium condition can be expressed in terms of the endogenous variables w
and pE
s(1− β)
¡
pE − c
¢2
2pE − c = s
(1− c)2
2− c . (9)
It is straightforward to verify that equation (9) can be solved for the price of the exclusive good
pE and expressed as a function of marginal costs c.8 For further use express the equilibrium
condition (9) as pE = p(c) with p0(c) < 0. The negative relationship between pE and c is
very intuitive. A reduction in the marginal cost c increases profits per unit of output by the
same (absolute) amount both for exclusive producers and for mass producers. With prices
unchanged, the larger market lets profits of mass producers increase more strongly than the
profits of exclusive producers. To restore equilibrium, a higher price pE is required to ensure
equal profits of the two types of producers.
3.2 Firm entry and the allocation of skilled labor
In the above discussion we have assumed a given number of firms N . In this section we discuss
how firm entry is determined. Since only skilled labor can set up and run a modern firm, we will
8Equation (9) is a quadratic equation in pE . To see that pE is decreasing in c it is straightforward to calculate
the relevant root of pE as pE = p(c) = c+ (1− c)2 + (1− c) 1− β (2− c) c / [(1− β) (2− c)] .
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see that the determination of firm entry closely interacts with the allocation and compensation
of skilled labor. Given the Leontief technology in the production of differentiated goods we
have a fixed relation between the amount of skilled and unskilled labor, HY and LY ,
HY
LY
=
1− α
α
. (10)
Using the fixed input ratio, it is straightforward to calculate, for a given amount of unskilled
labor LY , the equilibrium allocation of skilled labor between production and firm creation.
Denote by HN is the amount of skilled labor engaged in setting up modern firms. As the fixed
cost of firm creation equals F units of skilled labor, we have HN = FN . In equilibrium, skilled
labor is fully employed, hence we have H = HN +HY . We now use expression (10) and make
use of the fact that LY , the level of unskilled labor in production, is equal to the quantity of
unskilled labor supplied L. This allows us to express the number of entering firms N as a
function of , the percentage of unskilled labor that finds employment in the formal sector
N( ) =
H − 1−αα L
F
. (11)
We note that is an endogenous variable to be determined below.
The latter two equations determine the allocation of skilled labor but do not say anything
about its compensation. In equilibrium, skilled workers have to be indifferent between working
in the production of final output or providing skills for firm creation. We can determine r,
the compensation of skilled labor from the zero-profit condition for firm entry. In equilibrium,
unexploited profit opportunities may not exist, hence the fixed entry cost, rF , may not fall
short of the operating profits of an active (exclusive or mass) producer ΠM = ΠE. Using
Lemma 1, we can express r as a function of unit production costs c as
r(c) =
s
F
(1− c)2
2− c , with r
0(c) < 0. (12)
A higher unit cost of production reduces profits, hence skilled labor becomes, ceteris paribus,
less valuable.
Recall that with Leontief technology the unit cost of production are given by c = a−1 (r/α+w/(1− α)).
From this relation we can express w, the compensation of unskilled labor, as a function of c
w(c) =
Ã
ac− s
αF
(1− c)2
2− c
!
(1− α), with w0(c) > 0. (13)
3.3 The market for unskilled labor
We are now ready to address the variable of our main interest: the equilibrium level of em-
ployment in the formal sector. It turns out that the equilibrium conditions can be reduced
to two equations in the two unknowns c and . We call the first of these two relations the
"general-equilibrium demand relation for unskilled labor". This relation is defined as follows.
11
Definition 1 The general-equilibrium demand relation for unskilled labor are combi-
nations of (c, ) along which (i) households obey first order conditions (2) and (4) and exhaust
their budget constraints; (ii) firms maximize operating profits, i.e. mass producing firms set
price pM = 1 and sell output XM(c) and exclusive firms set price pE = p(c) and sell quantity
XE(c) (see Lemma 1); (iii) employment is L i.e. any given amount of unskilled labor supplied
finds a job in the formal sector; (iv) the free entry condition (11) is satisfied.
Notice that, while the above relation imposes full employment of a given amount of labor
L supplied by poor households to the formal sector, this condition does not require that the
quantity L is optimal from the perspective of poor households. (This optimality requirement
is captured by the second general-equilibrium relation in c and , see below).
We proceed by deriving the general equilibrium labor demand relation. In an asymmetric
equilibrium, there are mass producers with unskilled labor demand [a(1− α)]−1XM and ex-
clusive producers with unskilled labor demand [a(1− α)]−1XE . Denoting by n the share of
mass producers among all active firms, the aggregate demand for unskilled labor is given by
[a(1− α)]−1
£
nXM + (1− n)XE
¤
N . Notice that XM and XE depend only on c but not on ,
see Lemma 1, and that the equilibrium number of active firms N depends only on but not
on c, see equation (11).
It remains to determine how n is related to c and . Clearly, the percentage of mass pro-
ducers n is of crucial interest in the present context. Intuitively, an economy that concentrates
on mass production will generate better employment opportunities for unskilled labor than
an economy in which the formal sector focuses primarily on the satisfaction of wants of the
rich. We can express the percentage of mass producers n in terms of c and using the poor
households’ budget constraint w L/β = nNxMP . Making use of Lemma 1 and equations (11)
and (13) lets us write
n(c, ) =
w(c)
xMP (c)
L
βN( )
. (14)
Notice that n (c, ) ≡ ∂n(c, )/∂ > 0. This is quite intuitive. When the unskilled households
devote much of their labor force to employment in the formal sector, this will generate a higher
formal-sector income and hence high demand for products in this sector. This induces many
firms to become mass producers. We also have nc(c, ) ≡ ∂n(c, )/∂c > 0. There are two
effects at work. On the one hand, higher production costs c are associated with higher wages
from (13) and thus a higher aggregate income by poor households w(c) L. This will lead to
a higher prevalence of mass production. On the other hand, a higher c also implies that each
producer will reduce their output (From Lemma 1, we have ∂XM/∂c < 0). This lower output
arises from lower sales to both rich and poor households, hence ∂xMP /∂c < 0. This means that
the poor will spread their income across a larger number of goods. In sum, an increase in c
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increases n, i.e. higher production costs are associated with more mass consumption.
We can now discuss how c and are related along the general-equilibrium labor-demand
relation. It turns out convenient to define the excess demand function Ψ(c, ) given by the
difference between unskilled labor demand [a(1− α)]−1
£
nXM + (1− n)XE
¤
N and unskilled
labor supply L. In general equilibrium we have
Ψ(c, ) ≡ N( )
a(1− α)
£
n(c, )XM(c) + (1− n(c, ))XE(c)
¤
− L = 0. (15)
The first term on the right-hand-side of (15) nicely shows how the demand of formal-sector
firms for unskilled labor comprises of three different components and how these components
demand on c and : (i) the number of active firms N( ) determined by (11); (ii) the percentage
of mass producers among active firms n(c, ) given by equation (14); and (iii) the labor demands
of mass producers and exclusive producers, respectively, given by Lemma 1.
To characterize the curvature of the general-equilibrium labor-demand relation in (c, )
space we examine the derivatives of the function Ψ(c, ) with respect to c and . Note first that
Ψ (c, ) < 0.9 This says that an increase in labor supply is not fully matched by an the increase
in labor demand due to higher market income of the poor w L. Notice further that the sign of
[a(1− α)]Ψc(c, ) = Nnc
£
XM −XE
¤
+N
£
n∂XM/∂c+ (1− n)∂XE/∂c
¤
is not clear a priori.
On the one hand, an increase in c is associated with higher real incomes of poor households.
The resulting increase in demand for differentiated products stimulates the incentive for mass
production. This purchasing power effect is captured by the term nc
£
XM(c)−XE(c)
¤
> 0.
On the other hand, higher unit costs c induce firms to reduce employment and production.
This familiar cost effect is captured by the term n∂XM/∂c+ (1− n)∂XE/∂c < 0. 10
We turn to labor supply which yields a second condition in c and . The labor supply
relation takes account of optimal labor supply choices by poor households. It is defined as
follows
9To see this, note that
[a(1− α)]Ψ (c, ) = n XM −XE N + nXM + (1− n)XE ∂N/∂ − a(1− α)L
To sign the derivative, observe that n = n(1− ( /N)∂N/∂ ) and N nXM + (1− n)XE < a(1− α)L.
10 It is not straighforward to derive a meaningful condition under which the purchasing power effect dominates
the cost effect and vice versa. We therefore undertook a large number of simulations to learn the slope of the
general equilibrium labor demand relation. In all cases, we found that the purchasing power effect dominates
the cost effect, so that Ψc(c, ) > 0 and the general equilibrium labor demand relation is upward sloping in (c, )
space. The reason for the apparent dominance of the purchasing power effect is our assumption that income
classes and income sources coincide. An increase in unskilled wages benefits the poor (and even harms the rich).
In contrast, if both rich and poor households had the same relative endowments with skilled and unskilled labor
(but the rich were better endowed with both factors) both types of households would be equally affected by
a change in factor prices. In that case the purchasing power effect vanishes. This is discussed in a previous
version of this paper (Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2008).
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Definition 2 The general-equilibrium supply relation of unskilled labor are combina-
tions of (c, ) along which (i) all poor households obey first order conditions (4) and (5); and
(ii) poor households purchase the quantity xMP (c) from mass producers (see Lemma 1).
We have assumed that poor households allocate their labor supply optimally between the
formal sector and subsistence. Hence in equilibrium they need to be indifferent between working
in the formal sector or working in subsistence production. Optimal labor supply choices by
poor households obey first order conditions (4) and (5). Combining the two conditions yields
γ/w = s − xMP . From (13) and Lemma 1, we know that, in general equilibrium, both w and
xMP depends only on c but does not depend on . Hence , the optimal fraction of unskilled
labor supplied to the formal sector, is given by11
= 0 when γ/w(c) > s− xMP (c)
∈ [0, 1] when γ/w(c) = s− xMP (c)
= 1 when γ/w(c) < s− xMP (c)
(16)
Condition (16) says that there is a cut off level for the unskilled wage, w(c∗), defined as
γ/w(c∗) = s− xMP (c∗). The cutoff level is larger than zero (the wage rate (13) becomes zero at
c > 0) and smaller than one (because γ/s < a(1−α) by assumption). When the unskilled wage
falls short of this cut off, poor households remain in subsistence; and they prefer employment
in the formal sector if the wage exceeds this critical level. Only when the wage is exactly equal
to w(c∗) an interior solution where poor households devote their labor resources partly to the
formal sector and partly the subsistence sector prevails.
4 A symmetric equilibrium
Before we start to analyze the role of economic inequality for the size and employment of the
formal sector, let us briefly address the situation of a symmetric equilibrium. Since inequality
is endogenous, inter alia determined by factor prices, it could be that parameter values are
such that low inequality arises in equilibrium in which the equilibrium outcome is symmetric,
i.e. all firms are mass producers.
The market for skilled labor works just like in the asymmetric equilibrium, so equations
(11), (12) and (13) continue to hold. By definition of a symmetric equilibrium, all formal-sector
firms are mass producers and supply quantity XM(c) = (1− c)/(2− c) at price pM = 1. The
11Notice that the condition (16) is not a labor supply curve in the usual sense. Just like the general equilibrium
labor demand curve defined above, the labor supply curve (16) requires that general quilibrium conditions hold.
In particular, all households are required to supply their labor power optimally and all mass producers firms
sell the quantity xMP (c) to poor households.
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general-equilibrium labor-demand relation is therefore given by
L =
sN( )
a(1− α)
1− c
2− c . (17)
Notice that in the symmetric equilibrium the demand for labor is falling in c. This is because
only the cost effect is at work that induces mass producers to supply less output. The pur-
chasing power effect of a higher c is not at work in the symmetric case (i.e. in the absence of
exclusive firms who could become mass producers). Income distribution does not have an effect
on demand for labor in the symmetric case because quadratic preferences are non-homothetic
but belong to the HARA class. The latter implies that the marginal propensity to consume is
the same across all income classes as long as a product is consumed.
Just like in the asymmetric case, the second equilibrium relation in c and needs to
consider optimal labor supply choices by poor households. The first order conditions (4) and
(5) still hold and we have γ/w = s − xMP . The poor households’ budget constraint requires
xMP (c, ) = w(c) L/ (βN( )) in a symmetric equilibrium. As Lemma 1 applies only in the
asymmetric case but does not apply in a symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium level of xMP
is no longer independent of . Hence the optimal fraction of unskilled labor supplied to the
formal sector, is given by
= 0 when γ/w(c) > s
∈ [0, 1] when γ/w(c) = s−w(c) L/ (βN( ))
= 1 when γ/w(c) < s−w(c)L/ (βN(1)) .
(18)
Equations (17) and (18) form the system of two equations in the two unknowns c and . Notice
the difference in the general-equilibrium labor-supply curve between the symmetric and the
asymmetric case. In a symmetric equilibrium, a higher lets poor households expand the
consumption of differentiated goods mainly along the intensive margin, i.e. by increasing
xMP . Given the consumers’ utility function this implies decreasing marginal utility.
12 Since
the marginal utility from consuming less subsistence goods is constant, a higher wage w(c) is
needed to induce poor households working in the formal sector. This implies an upward sloping
general-equilibrium labor-supply curve. (Recall that w(c) is increasing in c from (13)). The
situation is different in the asymmetric equilibrium where the increased income from a higher
lets poor households expand their consumption along the extensive margin, i.e. they purchase
more differentiated goods, each at the same quantity xMP (c). (Recall that, from Lemma 1,
the quantity xMP (c) is independent of .) Together with the constant marginal utility of the
subsistence good this gives a flat general-equilibrium labor-supply curve.
12Since the total number of firms N( ) decreases when increases, poor households have to spread their
consumption over a more narrow range of goods which increases xMP (and hence decreases marginal utility) even
further.
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5 Existence of equilibrium
The previous sections characterized the properties of both an asymmetric and a symmetric
equilibrium. This section will prove the existence of an equilibrium formally.
In the above section 4 we have characterized a symmetric equilibrium where all firms are
mass producers and sell to all households. To check whether this is a Nash equilibrium, we
consider a situation where all other firms charge a low price and sell to all consumers and then
we check whether a single firm has an incentive to deviate, i.e. set a high price and become
an exclusive producer. It turns out that the exclusion strategy is worthwhile if the income
disparities between rich and poor households are sufficiently large. This is very intuitive. Were
rich and poor almost identical, the steep segment of the market demand curve would become
irrelevant and all firms would prefer to benefit from the large market. However, when the
income disparities are sufficiently large, it pays to exploit the higher willingness to pay by rich
households and the exclusion strategy becomes a profitable option. The general equilibrium in
a symmetric equilibrium is characterized by (17) and (18). It turns out useful to express the
equilibrium level of marginal cost by the implicit expression
csym =
H − (2ζ + 1)1−αα L
H − (ζ + 1)1−αα L
, (19)
where ζ = αaF/s and 0 ≤ ≤ 1. If ≤ 1, it is determined by γ/w(csym) = s−w(csym) L/ (βN( )) .
Using (17) and (18) we see that csym does not change if H and L change proportionally. The
following proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A symmetric equilibrium exists iff [(1− β)(1− ξ) + (1− ξ)ξ]2 /
£
4
¡
(1− β)(1− ξ)− ξ2
¢¤
<
1 with ξ =
£
H − (2ζ + 1)1−αα L
¤
/
£
H − (ζ + 1)1−αα L
¤
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If this condition is violated, there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium because - as shown
in Appendix A - a symmetric equilibrium does not constitute a Nash equilibrium for the
monopolistic firms. The reverse statement, however, is not true. If the condition in Proposition
1 holds, a symmetric equilibrium exists but there may be asymmetric equilibria as well.
Proposition 1 allows us to separate the two equilibrium regimes. Note that we may
express the condition in the proposition in the terms of marginal costs: If c < ĉ where
[(1− β)(2− ĉ) + ĉ (1− ĉ)]2 /
h
4
³
(1− β)(2− ĉ)− (1− ĉ)2
´i
= 1, a symmetric equilibrium can-
not exist.
The condition always holds if ξ → 0,and is always violated if ξ → 1/2. It is shown in
the proof of Proposition 1 that the left-hand-side of the condition increases in ξ. A rise in
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ξ implies that an asymmetric equilibrium becomes more likely. The reason is the following.
A higher level of
£
H − (2ζ + 1)1−αα L
¤
/
£
H − (ζ + 1)1−αα L
¤
means - in equilibrium - higher
production per firm and allows an increase in consumption for both groups. This increases
mark-ups as both types of consumers purchase at a less elastic point on their individual demand
curves. However, since rich consumers are closer to their saturation point than the average
consumer this causes a disproportionate decrease in their demand elasticity. In other words,
when
£
H − (2ζ + 1)1−αα L
¤
/
£
H − (ζ + 1)1−αα L
¤
increases mark-ups increase more strongly
when firms sell exclusively to the rich and increase less strongly when they sell on mass mar-
kets. As a result, the exclusion strategy becomes more attractive. Hence, and confirming our
intuition, the above condition in Proposition 1 is more likely to hold with higher inequality,
that is when ζ is large. This confirms our claim that, when inequality is sufficiently high, an
asymmetric outcome will prevail.
The following Proposition 2 states that at least one equilibrium (either symmetric or asym-
metric) exists. This implies if no symmetric equilibrium exists, the remaining equilibrium (be
it single or multiple) must be asymmetric.
Proposition 2 a) An asymmetric equilibrium prevails when (c, ) combinations are such that
n(c, ) < 1 in (14) and equations (15) and (16) hold. b) A symmetric equilibrium prevails when
(c, ) combinations are such that n(c, ) ≥ 1 and equations (17) and (18) hold.
Proof. Consider first (c, ) combinations where n(c, ) < 1.We examine the axes intercepts
in the (c, ) space of the general-equilibrium labor demand N( )a(1−α)
£
n(c, )XM(c) + (1− n(c, ))XE(c)
¤
=
Ψ(c, ) + L. First, Ψ(c, 0) = H/Fa(1−α)X
E(c) > 0, hence fulfilling (15) must be greater than 0.
Second, Ψ(1, ) + L = − L+ L = 0. We know that 0 < c∗ < 1 in (16). Hence 1 > c ≥ c∗ and
0 < ≤ 1 solve (15) and (16) simultaneously. For (c, ) combinations where n(c, ) ≥ 1, the
equilibrium is symmetric. For c ≥ ĉ, GE labor demand simplifies to N( )a(1−α)XM(c) (see Figure
2 below). The vertical axis intercept is still given by (c, ) = (1, 0).
6 Inequality and formal-sector employment
We are now ready to address the question of our main interest. How does the extent of economic
inequality affect the poor households’ employment opportunities in the formal sector? We
will focus on an asymmetric equilibrium because this case captures the main features that
characterize a typical developing country: high inequality and limited entry. However, to give
the comprehensive picture we also capture the case where parameters are such that a symmetric
equilibrium emerges.
17
It turns out convenient to rely on a graphical exposition where we draw the general-
equilibrium demand and supply relations for unskilled labor in (c, ) space (Figure 2). Consider
the labor demand relation. For sufficiently low values of c < ĉ (see Proposition 1) unskilled
wages w(c) are so low and inequality so high that the general equilibrium will be asymmetric
and equilibrium relations (15) and (16) are relevant. The switch from an asymmetric to a
symmetric equilibrium occurs at c = ĉ. When costs approach this critical level from below,
the fraction of firms that become mass producers converges towards unity. When c ≥ ĉ we end
up in an symmetric equilibrium where labor demand and supply relations (17) and (18) are
relevant. The other critical level of c is c∗, at which poor households are indifferent between
working in the formal sector or remaining in subsistence (see discussion following equation
(16). Obviously, the supply relation (16) is relevant only when ĉ > c∗ and the supply relation
(18) is relevant for values of c ≥ ĉ.
Figure 2
Figure 2 captures the case of an asymmetric equilibrium. The labor demand relation is
assumed to be upward sloping in the asymmetric region c < ĉ.13 At c = ĉ there is a kink
and in the symmetric region c ≥ ĉ the labor demand relation is downward sloping. Panel a)
of Figure 2 is drawn for the case c∗ < ĉ so that an intersection between the curves occurs in
the flat part of the labor supply relation. Alternatively, panel b) assumes that c∗ > ĉ so that
an equilibrium where both the formal and the informal sector are active must be a symmetric
one.
In what follows we study the consequences of changes in inequality. In the context of our
model, there are two crucial parameters that determine the distribution of formal-sector in-
come: productivity in subsistence γ and the population size of the poor β. Since our analysis
wants to capture changes in inequality in the context of a developing economy, we concentrate
on an asymmetric outcome. Let us first consider the impact of higher productivity in subsis-
tence γ (Figure 3). Notice that γ affects the labor supply relation (16) but does not show up in
the labor demand relations (15) and (17). An increase in γ shifts the labor supply relation up.
With a positively sloped labor demand relation as in Figure 3, this leads to both a higher c and
higher . In other words, an improvement in subsistence productivity may foster formal-sector
employment of unskilled workers and increase formal-sector wages of unskilled workers.
Figure 3
Proposition 3 a) An increase in subsistence productivity γ may lead to an increase of un-
skilled wages w and unskilled employment L. b) An increase in employment is associated with
13We found upward sloping labor demand relations in all our simulations, see previous footnote.
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more mass producing firms nN and less exclusive firms (1− n)N . The total number of active
firms N decreases. c) An increase in γ may increase welfare of rich households.
Part a) of the proposition states that the higher wages associated with an increase in γ
may lead to an increase in employment of formal-sector firms. The reason is that the increased
purchasing power of poor households induces many exclusive producers to become mass pro-
ducers. These firms lower their prices to levels that poor households can afford and hire more
(skilled and unskilled) workers to satisfy the increased demand for their products. Working
against this, the higher marginal costs (through wages) reduce the levels of employment of both
mass and exclusive producers. However, when the former purchasing power effect dominates
the latter cost effect (which is equivalent for the general-equilibrium labor-demand relation to
have a positive slope) more unskilled workers find employment in the formal sector.14
Notice that the result in part a) of the proposition is prima facie surprising. The utility
functions in (1) and (3) assume a constant marginal utility for the subsistence good whereas
marginal utilities are decreasing for differentiated products. Hence one would expect more
economic activity in the subsistence sector when subsistence productivity increases (while pro-
ductivity in the modern sector remains unchanged). Proposition 1 states the opposite outcome
is possible and simulations show that such an outcome is very likely. In sum, purchasing power
effects arising from non-homothetic preferences over differentiated products may be strong as
the associated changes in price elasticities lead to changes in market sizes, equilibrium prices,
and mark-ups triggering employment effects that may be larger than the cost effects of higher
wages for unskilled labor in the formal sector.
Part b) of the proposition says that the increase in unskilled employment is associated
with a higher prevalence of mass consumption but less entry of firms, see equation (11). In
other words, the lower inequality in society associated with a higher γ lowers entry but leads
to a concentration of output in mass production. Finally, part c) of the proposition states
that not only poor households but also rich households may benefit from lower inequality.
This is surprising as higher unskilled wages are associated with lower wages for skilled workers
and hence a reduction in their income. However, rich households benefit from the low prices
associated with the concentration on mass consumption. This effect may overcompensate rich
households for the lower production variety due to less firm entry.15
14Simulations show that a positive slope of the general equilibrium labor demand relation is the likely case
in an asymmetric equilibrium. In simulations we were unable to find a single parameter constellation where
this relation is downward sloping. Hence, the statement Proposition 1 does not hold just locally, but it is the
relevant outcome in the context of the present framework.
15To see this, consider the following parameter constellation H = L = F = 1, a = 2, α = β = 0.5 and s = 4.
With γ > 0.48 welfare of rich households increases when γ rises.
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Let us next examine a change in the population share of the poor β (Figure 4). The
parameter β shows up both in the labor demand relation via its effect on the percentage mass
producers n and the output of exclusive producers XE (see equation (14) and Lemma 1. The
labor supply relation is affected by β via consumption level of the poor xMP . It can be shown
that an increase in β shifts the labor demand relation to the left and shift the labor supply
relation upwards.
Figure 4
Lemma 2 A higher β lowers employment for given c, i.e., it shifts the labor demand schedule
to the left.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 4 A higher extent of inequality due to a higher population share of poor house-
holds β tends to reduce employment of unskilled workers and leads to more firm entry N but
less mass production nN .
The proposition states that there is negative relationship between economic inequality and
formal-sector employment when inequality is generated by a change in the second distribution
parameter of the model, the group share of the poor β. Recall that formal-sector income of a
poor household is w L/β and the income of a rich household is rH/(1− β). Hence a higher β
increases inequality both directly via population shares and indirectly via relative incomes.16
Inspection of the labor demand relation (15) shows that an increase in β generates two effects.
The first effect works through the reduction in the income of poor households when β rises.
Consequently, less goods are sold to the poor, i.e. ∂n/∂β < 0 as follows from the proof of
Lemma 2. The second effect works via the effect of β on prices and market sizes of exclusive
goods. A higher β implies that there are fewer rich households which per se tends to reduce
output and employment of exclusive producers. However, a higher β also increases the incomes
of rich households which works in the opposite direction. Hence the direction of the second
effect is a priori unclear. However, the overall effect of an increase in β is to lower employment
of unskilled labor. To see this, note that for a given c and (and hence a given w and given
r), there is no direct effect on incomes of the poor and the rich as a group, w L and rH. With
less mass producers the rich spend a larger fraction of their income on exclusive goods and this
reallocation of expenditures reduces overall employment. The reason is that the higher prices
16The Lorenz curve is piecewise linear with population shares β and 1 − β and income shares w L/Y and
rH/Y where aggregate income is Y = w L+ rH.
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(but identical labor requirements) of exclusive goods imply that a given amount of expenditures
spent on exclusive goods generates lower labor demand than the same amount spent on mass
products. Hence the labor demand relation shifts to the left.
The general-equilibrium labor-supply relation shifts up when β rises. Note that we have
∂xMP /∂β > 0. A larger β raises, in equilibrium, the price ratio between exclusive and mass
products. Hence, markups on all products must rise due to (A3). Higher markups are only
compatible with higher quantities in equilibrium, because the elasticity of demand decreases in
consumption. To keep workers indifferent between working in subsistence and working in the
formal sector a higher wage w(c) (and hence higher marginal cost c) is needed. Since all our
simulations rendered an upward sloping labor demand, the net effect on employment is unclear
(Figure 4). However, we were unable to find a parameter constellation where employment has
risen after β had increased.
Finally, the effects of higher inequality on industry structure nN and firm entry N are
very similar irrespective of whether higher inequality is generated from a higher β or from a
lower γ. As long as the labor demand is upward sloping, in both cases a more unequal society
concentrates its resources less in mass production and generates more overall firm entry from
which only the rich benefit.
The above discussion has concentrated on an asymmetric equilibrium which is the case of
our main interest. In the less interesting situation of a symmetric equilibrium, increases in
inequality (due to a higher β and/or a lower γ) leave the labor demand relation unaffected (see
equation (17)) and shift the labor supply relation down. Hence in equilibrium, more inequality
is associated with higher formal-sector employment, because lower unskilled wages induces
firms (all of them are mass producers) to hire more workers.
7 How general are our results?
In this paper we have presented an model where consumers have non-homothetic preferences
and where the distribution of income plays a central role for aggregate employment. Our
model has started out from simplifying assumptions. Let us briefly discuss the robustness of
our results with respect to these assumptions.
Preferences In our model we have assumed a quadratic subutility function. We used the
quadratic specification because it keeps the analysis simple and yields closed form solutions.
The quadratic subutility function has two crucial properties. First, the marginal utility from
consuming the first unit is finite, v0(0) = s <∞. This is a necessary condition for an equilibrium
where poor consumers do not want to afford all goods (i.e. the non-negativity constraint may
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become binding). Second, the quadratic specification implies a linear demand curve of a
particular consumer and a price elasticity of demand that decreases in consumed quantity.
Denoting by η(c) the price elasticity of demand we have η(c) = (s− c) /c, which is decreasing
in c.17.
Our analysis extends in a straightforward way to the subclass of hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) preferences that feature v0(0) < ∞. HARA preferences with this property
also feature decreasing price elasticities along individual demand curves. Provided that this
elasticity falls below unity at a finite c, equilibria with informal-sector employment are possible
under appropriate parameter values. We elaborate this in greater detail in Appendix C. Going
beyond HARA, things become more complicated because the distribution of income affects
consumption along not only the extensive margin (how many consumers can purchase a certain
good) but also the intensive margin. As Engel-curves are no longer linear, market demand
curves depend on the distribution of income, even in symmetric equilibria.18
While our analysis relied on non-homothetic preferences, our particular specification of
non-homotheticities differs from most previous papers. In our framework, non-homotheticities
operate entirely via the demand functions for differentiated products of the formal sector.
These demand functions feature decreasing price elasticities and finite reservation prices, thus
generating interesting interactions between income inequality on the one side and price, mark-
ups, and employment on the other side. In this sense, our model highlights a mechanism that
has been largely neglected so far. Our specification differs from much of the previous literature
that has assumed strong non-homotheticities in the subsistence ("elementary") good. Adopting
a similar assumption here would reinforce our results. Due to such non-homotheticities, any
rise in formal-sector incomes (through an increase in a and/or a decrease in F ) would lead to
an even stronger shift of demand towards differentiated products and away from subsistence.
Technology We assumed that there is no substitution possible between skilled and unskilled
workers in the formal sector. However, the result that purchasing power effects may dominate
cost effects still holds true if we allow for substitution between the two types of labor. In-
terestingly, in the other polar case, with perfect substitution, the same effects are present: as
long as unskilled labor is cheaper (per efficiency unit) than skilled labor, only the unskilled
17Note that the properties of a quadratic subutility function are quite different from those of the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. In that case, v0(0) =∞, so even the poorest consumers purchase all goods that are
supplied (albeit in tiny amounts), and the elasticity of demand (c) is the same for all consumers, i.e., it does
not depend on consumed quantities.
18Foellmi and Zweimüller (2004) analyze the impact of inequality on mark-ups in the context of a symmetric
equilibrium. It turns out that the curvature of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, −v00(c)/v0(c), determines
whether higher inequality in the size distribution of income increases or decreases the mark-up.
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are employed in the formal sector. A small increase in unskilled wages will not change this
allocation and will leave the number of firms unchanged, but it may increase employment due
to the purchasing power effect (for an analysis of this case with a more general production
function, see Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2008).
For intermediate degrees of the elasticity of substitution the cost effect of higher low-skilled
wages presumably becomes stronger. Compared to the Leontief case, labor demand falls more
strongly when marginal costs c and hence wages w(c) increase. Firms will replace unskilled by
skilled workers so that an upward-sloping labor demand relation, while still possible, becomes
less likely.19
More general distributions A simplifying assumption of our analysis was that there are
only two types of consumers, the rich and the poor. How would the analysis change by allowing
for arbitrarily many groups? To get the intuition of how the analysis extends to many groups,
consider the case of two groups of unskilled workers so there are three groups: the rich, the
poor and the middle class. A candidate for a general equilibrium would be a situation where
some firms sell only to the rich, other firms sell to the rich and the middle class and a final
group of firms sells to all consumers. Whether or not such an equilibrium arises depends on
how different the various groups are. When the rich, the middle class and the poor differ
only slightly, a symmetric equilibrium will arise. When the rich and the middle class are very
similar, there will be a situation where the poor but not the middle class are excluded from
some markets. When the poor and the middle class are very similar, the poor and the middle
class are excluded from the same markets, and so on. It is obvious that this line of reasoning can
be extended to the general case with x different groups of households. The equilibrium will be
characterized by z ≤ x different types of firms, where z is weakly smaller than x, reflecting the
fact that the market equilibrium merges very similar groups. Furthermore, a redistribution of
income from richer to poorer households has effects analogous to the redistribution discussed
in the two-group economy, provided that the redistribution occurs between groups that are
sufficiently different.
Regarding the labor supply, the picture would also look different. When there are many
types of low-skilled workers, the labor supply curve would become smooth, generating a critical
group that is indifferent between subsistence and formal-sector work. All workers poorer than
this critical group remain in subsistence, whereas all workers richer than this critical group
take a job in the formal sector.
19We performed simulations for a Cobb-Douglas technology in the formal sector. When the income share of
the high-skilled in the formal sector is sufficiently low, the general-equilibrium demand curve is still upward
sloping.
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Theoretical predictions and empirical evidence Our model has several distinctive im-
plications about relative prices, markups, and firm sizes. One empirically testable prediction
is that mark-ups are higher in more unequal economies. We are not aware of any systematic
evidence on the determinants of mark-ups in developing economies. For developed economies,
however, Edmond and Veldkamp (2008) do indeed find a positive correlation between earnings
inequality and markups. Manova and Zhang (2009), using cross-country data, show that firms
set higher mark-ups in richer markets. This is consistent with the prediction of our model
that prices and mark-ups vary systematically with the income level of consumers. A further
prediction of our model is that the size distribution of firms mirrors the extent of inequality
in the size distribution of endowments (such as land and human capital). Empirical evidence
from developing countries suggests that the size distribution of firms is indeed very unequal
and polarized in poor countries, where inequality is typically very high (Tybout, 2000). (See,
e.g., Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002, for an empirical analysis of the firm size distribution in
Côte d’Ivoire, a country with extremely high inequality). While the firm-size distribution is
affected by many different channels, we think it is worthwhile to explore the role of purchasing
power and the size of consumer markets.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the impact of income inequality on formal-sector employment in
a less developed economy. Our analysis provides a theoretical explanation for the old argument
that a more egalitarian distribution of income, by generating purchasing power for the lower
classes, may enhance employment opportunities and help to overcome the underemployment
problem. In contrast to the previous literature, we emphasize a demand channel through which
income inequality affects the price-setting behavior and employment decisions of monopolistic
firms. We study a dual-economy framework where consumers have non-homothetic preferences
over the goods produced in the modern sector. Combining these preferences with the standard
monopolistic competition framework allows us to highlight a potentially important channel
through which inequality may affect aggregate employment. In particular, we have shown that
in an unequal society, there are "exclusive firms", that set high prices (and mark-ups) and sell
only to the rich, and "mass producers", which set low prices and serve the entire customer
base. By generating more mass production, a more egalitarian society is able to absorb a larger
fraction of employment and reduce the reserve army of labor trapped in subsistence.
This adverse effect of inequality on formal-sector employment works via the changing com-
position of firms. Higher inequality generates increased incentives to exploit the high willing-
ness to pay among the rich consumers, which shifts the composition of firms away from being
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mass producers towards being small, exclusive firms. The decrease in employment by mass
producers is not fully offset by the higher entry and employment of exclusive producers. We
have also shown that an increase in subsistence productivity boosts formal-sector wages and
the employment of unskilled workers. Higher wages in the formal sector generate purchasing
power effects that increase mass production. The purchasing power effect (higher employment
due to more mass production) dominates the familiar cost effect (lower employment due to
higher production costs). The increase in unskilled wages, while reducing the incomes of the
rich, may nevertheless improve their welfare due to higher production and lower prices of goods
in the formal sector.
While our analysis relied on the assumption of non-homothetic preferences, the way in
which such preferences are adopted in the present paper differs substantially from most pre-
vious papers that have relied on an explanation based on non-homothetic preferences. The
specification of non-homothetic preferences in the existing literature typically relies on income
elasticities below unity in the subsistence sector and income elasticities above unity in the
formal sector. This is different in the present framework. Under our specification, a uniform
increase in income, for example, through a joint increase in productivity a and decrease in
fixed costs F to leave aF unaffected, does not change the sectoral composition as long as rela-
tive prices remain unchanged. In contrast, non-homotheticities work entirely via the demand
functions for differentiated products of the formal sector. These demand functions feature de-
creasing price elasticities and finite reservation prices, thus generating interesting interactions
between income inequality on the one side and price, mark-ups, and employment on the other
side. In this sense, our model highlights a mechanism that has been largely neglected so far.
Our model could be extended in various directions. First, our model is static, and it may
be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a dynamic context. Allowing for innovation decisions
brings interesting new elements into the picture. With non-homothetic preferences, distribution
will affect the choice of whether to introduce new products or to search for more efficient
production processes. A second potentially interesting extension concerns international trade.
Our model is closed, and opening it up for international trade would enable the exploration of
the interaction between increasing returns and economic inequality as a determinant of trade
flows. Inter alia, this may provide a rationale for why terms of trade may be affected by demand
considerations (such as the relative size of home markets) and income distribution. A final
interesting extension concerns the medium-run equilibrium. While our analysis provides a much
richer framework to incorporate the price-setting behavior of firms, wage-setting behavior was
treated as a black-box. Incorporating wage-setting using more detailed assumptions on labor-
market institutions would be potentially interesting for studying the interaction of product
market and labor regulations for unemployment in the medium run.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium we must have ΠM ≥ ΠE so that no
firm has an incentive to deviate and adopt the exclusion strategy. In asymmetric equilibria,
mass consumption producers and exclusive producers must earn the same profit ΠM = ΠE . A
situation where ΠM < ΠE cannot be an equilibrium: no firm would sell to the poor, which
would leave them with idle purchasing power and very high willingness to pay for some goods.
Let us now find a condition under which no firm has an incentive to sell exclusively to the
rich. For a given wage level w we evaluate equilibrium profits in a symmetric equilibrium, we
denote these profits by Π̃E and Π̃M To derive an expression for Π̃E note that λR = s − xMR ,
pM is the numeraire. To determine xMR , we use the budget constraint of the rich in a symmetric
equilibrium: NxMR = Π
MH/F. Hence, xMR = s [1− c]
2 / [2− c] .We get the critical profits levels
Π̃E and Π̃M in terms of c and exogenous parameters
Π̃E =
s
4
[(1− β)(2− c) + c (1− c)]2 (1− c)2h
(1− β)(2− c)− (1− c)2
i
(2− c)
, and Π̃M = s
(1− c)2
2− c . (20)
The symmetric outcome is an equilibrium if, starting from a situation where all firms charge
a price that attracts the whole customer base, no single firm has an incentive to deviate and
adopt the exclusive good strategy. In other words, the inequality Π̃E < Π̃M must hold strictly.
Using equations (20), we get
Π̃E
Π̃M
=
1
4
[(1− β)(2− c) + c (1− c)]2
(1− β)(2− c)− (1− c)2
< 1 (21)
The left hand side of (21) is decreasing in c. We inspect the derivative
∂
∂c
1
4
[(1− β)(2− c) + c (1− c)]2
(1− β)(2− c)− (1− c)2
=
1
4
h
(1− β)(2− c)− (1− c)2 + (1− c)
i h
−2 (1− c)3 + 2β(1− β)− [6− β(5 + β)] c+ 3(1− β)c2
i
h
(1− β)(2− c)− (1− c)2
i2 < 0
Recall that (1−β)(2−c) > (1− c)2 , this implies the second term in brackets of the nominator
is increasing in β. At β = 1, the second term in brackets equals −2 (1− c)3 < 0, which confirms
the negative sign of the derivative. Further, LHS(c = 1) = (1− β)/4 < 1 and LHS(c = 0) =
(1 − β)2/ (1− 2β) > 1. Hence, there exists a unique wage level ĉ with LHS(ĉ) = 1. If the
equilibrium marginal cost csym is larger than ĉ, a symmetric equilibrium exists. To derive a
condition for existence of the symmetric equilibrium in terms of the parameters, we insert the
equilibrium marginal costs into (21). From (19) csym =
H− 1−α
α
L−2ζ
H−1−α
α
L−ζ <
H− 1−α
α
L−2ζ
H− 1−α
α
L−ζ , we get a
sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
1
4
[(1− β)(1− ξ) + (1− 2ξ)ξ]2£
(1− β)(1− ξ)− ξ2
¤
(1− ξ)2
< 1 with ξ ≡
H − (2ζ + 1)1−αα L
H − (ζ + 1)1−αα L
. (22)
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B. Proof of Lemma 2
We must show that ∂Ψ(c, )/∂β < 0.
∂Ψ
∂β
=
N
a(1− α)
∙
∂n
∂β
¡
XM −XE
¢
+
∂XE
∂β
¸
The expression in square brackets is negative if ∂xMP /∂β < 0 (which implies ∂n/∂β < 0, see
equation (14)) and ∂XE/∂β < 0.
To show that ∂n/∂β < 0 ≡ N( )a(1−α)
£
n(c, )XM(c) + (1− n(c, ))XE(c)
¤
− L
∂xMP (β)
∂β
=
s
β2
2
2pE − c
∙
pE − 1
2− c −
β(1− β)
2pE − c
∂pE
∂β
¸
Total differentiation of (9) gives the partial derivative of pE with respect to β,
∂pE
∂β
=
1
2
1
1− β
pE − c
pE
¡
2pE − c
¢
∂xMP (β)
∂β
=
s
β2
2
2pE − c
∙
pE − 1
2− c −
β
2
pE − c
pE
¸
=
s
β2
2
¡
pE − 1
¢
pE − β
¡
pE − c
¢
(2− c)
(2pE − c) (2− c)
The nominator ℵ is increasing in β. To show this we calculate its derivative
∂ℵ
∂β
=
pE − c
1− β
2
¡
2pE − c
¢
−
¡
2pE − c
¢ ¡
1 + β 2−cc
¢
/pE − (1− β) (2− c)
(2pE − c) (2− c)
=
pE − c
1− β
2pE − c+ 2
¡
pE − 1
¢
−
¡
2pE − c
¢
/pE + βc (2− c) /(2pE)
(2pE − c) (2− c) > 0
This implies that for all ℵ(β) = 2
¡
pE − 1
¢
pE − β
¡
pE − c
¢
(2− c) > ℵ(0) = 0. We conclude
that ∂x
M
P (β)
∂β > 0 for β > 0.
Finally, we show that ∂XE/∂β < 0. Note that XE = (1− β)xER = (1− β)s
pE−c
2pE−c
1
s
∂XE
∂β
= − p
E − c
2pE − c +
c(1− β)
(2pE − c)2
∂pE
∂β
= − p
E − c
2pE − c +
1
2
c
2pE − c
pE − c
pE
= −1
2
pE − c
pE
< 0.
C. More general preferences We show the following: With HARA preferences and v0(0)
finite, more inequality raises markups in a unique asymmetric equilibrium.
When preferences are HARA, v(.) is given by v0(c) = (c/σ + s)−σ with s > 0 and σ ∈ <.
Note that we get for σ = −1 the quadratic utility function used above. The assumption of
s > 0 guarantees that v0(0) is finite. The elasticity of substitution equals c/(c/σ + s) which is
monotonically increasing in c.
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To make things as simple as possible, we will consider an asymmetric equilibrium with
full employment in the formal sector. The generalized Stone-Geary with σ < 1 and negative
consumption requirement satisfies this property, for example.
Denote by xE and xM consumption of mass and exclusive goods, respectively. Instead of
the price of mass consumption goods, we now normalize marginal costs w/G = 1 and get the
following Lerner indices
pE − 1
pE
=
xE(1− β)
xE(1− β)/σ + s (A1)
and
pM − 1
pM
=
xM
xM/σ + s
. (A2)
The profit arbitrage condition is given by
¡
pM − 1
¢
xM =
¡
pE − 1
¢
xE. (A3)
For simplicity, we consider a full employment equilibrium, hence the aggregate resource con-
straint reads
nxM + (1− n)xE = 1. (A4)
Now consider a rise in inequality. In a unique equilibrium, more inequality leads to more
exclusion, i.e., a decrease in n. Assume to the contrary that pE falls. By (A1), xE must also
decrease. (A3) then implies that
¡
pM − 1
¢
xM falls. From (A2) we know, however, that pM
and xM are positively related. Therefore, both pM and xM must decrease. Taken together
nxM + (1−n)xE must fall (recall that xM > xE). But this contradicts the aggregate resource
constraint (A4). Hence, we conclude pE must increase. By the same reasoning, xE and
therefore pM and xM must increase. Thus, markups rise.
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